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I. INTRODUCTION
“The privacy that any computer user would and should and is justified
in expecting is illusory; Big Brother shrunk to a miniature cyber spy always
1
looms and never sleeps.” This is because an Internet user’s online activity
leaves electronic footprints, commonly called a “clickstream,” that
businesses routinely use to collect and create user profiles of personally
identifiable data that they later use and sell. As the Internet is now a part of
virtually every aspect of our lives, this process introduces wide-ranging
dangers regarding personal autonomy and dignity. Professor Lawrence
Lessig explains that “[t]he system watches what you do; it fits you into a
pattern; the pattern is then fed back to you in the form of options set by the
2
pattern; the options reinforce the pattern; the cycle begins again.” This
constant surveillance shifts power over one’s identity from the user to the
commercial entity, absorbing individuality and self-determined
independence. It destroys the feeling of freedom brought by anonymity and
the ability to be free from unsanctioned intrusion. And, it is pervasive. In
fact, in a recent lawsuit, Universal Image accused Yahoo! of watching,
spying, conducting surveillance, and analyzing “the habits, inclinations,
preferences, and tastes, and otherwise . . . follow[ing] and stalk[ing] those
3
who visit the . . . site.” Without recourse to an effective privacy law,
Universal Image has resorted to suing Yahoo! for violations of the criminal
and civil theft laws, criminal stalking laws, civil conversion laws, and civil
4
trespass laws. Indeed, in the largely unregulated cyber realm, the
applications of computer technology have introduced new possibilities for
marketers, insurance companies, employers, and other interested parties to
profit from users’ personal information in a variety of ways. Given the
ubiquity of unauthorized online profiling, what changes should be made to
safeguard privacy?
As the topic of data privacy is vast and the subject of much scrutiny,
this Comment focuses narrowly on commercial cyber-activities relating to
the nonconsensual Internet acquisition of personally identifiable user data.
This Comment begins with a brief examination of the technology that has
exacerbated privacy law’s inadequacies. It briefly discusses failed attempts
to safeguard privacy rights through the market and federal agency

1. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Verified Original Petition, Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction, at 34, Universal Image Inc. v. Yahoo, Inc.,
(Dallas County Ct. Tex. filed Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 99-13839-A), at http://legal.web.aol.com/
decisions/dlpriv/univtro2.pdf [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition].
2. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 154 (1999).
3. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, supra note 1, at 36.
4. Id. at 16-21, 34-39.
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management. It then addresses current U.S. privacy legislation and the
1995 European Privacy Directive. Finally, this Comment proposes the
creation of a new legislative system to effectively combat the surreptitious
collection, storage, use, and sale of personal data.

II. THE NEW FRONTIER OF WOE
Cyberspace introduces new privacy concerns. Its lack of physical
boundaries enables abusers to invade privacy with greater ease, efficiency,
and power than has been experienced in the offline world. What once
required extraneous methods of snooping, such as the manual planting of
listening devices or the tapping of phones, can now be done universally and
inexpensively through the online monitoring of clickstream data and builtin computer hardware. This invasion of privacy can also be done in much
greater detail. Unlike a transaction receipt in the physical world that simply
evidences a completed transaction, clickstream data is a record of a user’s
5
every online keystroke. Realizing its value, many online businesses,
including Yahoo!, RealNetworks, DoubleClick, and Amazon.com, actively
accumulate personally identifiable visitor information while an individual
6
visits their sites. Yahoo! President Jeffrey Mallet even publicly stated that
the information Yahoo! surreptitiously collects from users is its “single
7
greatest asset.” Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) possess even greater
collection abilities, as they can record a user’s entire clickstream because
the ISP is the user’s gateway to the Internet. Further, the decentralized
nature of the Internet guarantees the ability easily and instantaneously to
transfer accumulated data to any party, anywhere in the world, at any time.
Most browsers make information collection easy by disclosing the
referring page to a subsequent site every time a person clicks on a link,
along with their name or e-mail address, if it has been entered in the
8
9
browser’s software. This feature cannot be turned off. Although users can
purchase software to disguise themselves while online, they may encounter
situations where they have to disclose personal information in order to get a
desired benefit, such as making purchases, registering for free services, or
10
filling out surveys. By default, most browsers also enable Web sites to
5. WEBOPEDIA, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/c/clickstream.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2002).
6. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, supra note 1, at 4.
7. Id.
8. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1486 (2000).
9. Id.
10. See Freedom Privacy & Security Tools at http://www.freedom.net (last visited Oct.
2, 2001); Anonymizer Privacy Button at http://www.Anonymizer.com (last visited Oct. 2,
2001).
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read “cookies,” which allow the information a user gives to the Web site to
be stored and used to create a user profile. Cookies may be used to silently
track and record search terms, visited sites, and articles read in order to
build a detailed profile from information given to other Web sites; this data
11
can be shared between Web sites. Moreover, software makers like
Microsoft routinely exploit their collection abilities by embedding unique
identification numbers into documents so that documents transmitted
12
through Ethernet cards can be traced back to the sender’s computer.
Additionally, computer hardware makers, like Intel, have stealthily built
tracking features into their systems, making electronic anonymity nearly
13
impossible. More drastically, the upcoming Internet protocol version most
likely will use a computer’s Ethernet card to establish a permanent globally
unique identifier (“GUID”), creating unalterable fingerprints for each
14
computer.

III. LAW IN AN ELECTRONIC REGIME
A.

Failed Avenues

Internet threats to individual privacy abound, and many agree that it is
necessary to end the clandestine private sector invasion of individuals’
15
cherished ability to control the uses of their personal information. Internet
users should be empowered to make informed decisions about explicitly
trading their personal dossiers for desired benefits. Various approaches
exist to facilitate this end—among them self-regulation and legislation—
and it is important to examine each to understand why the creation of new
legislation for protecting online privacy is now necessary.

1.

The Market Approach

Studying online privacy issues since 1995, the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) found through its first online
survey in 1998 that 92% of Web sites collected personal information from

11. Froomkin, supra note 8, at 1486. According to Webopedia, an online data source,
cookies are defined as messages given to a Web browser by a Web server to store and then
send back to the server each time the browser requests a page from the server. Cookie,
WEBOPEDIA at http://webopedia.Internet.com/TERM/c/cookie.html (last visited Sept. 18,
2001). The main purpose of cookies is to identify visitors and to customize Web sites for
them. Id.
12. Froomkin, supra note 8, at 1492.
13. Id. at 1490.
14. Id. at 1525.
15. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 8, at 1461.
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online visitors, but only 14% disclosed their collection practices. The FTC
advocated industry use of “the widely-accepted fair information practice
17
principles of notice, choice, access, and security.” Despite its efforts, in
1999 the Commission reported “that only 10% of the sites posted
disclosures that even touched on all four fair information practice
18
principles.” Still, the Commission recommended that self-regulatory
19
efforts be given a chance to work. The FTC’s attitude changed in 2000,
however, when it found that despite its recommendations, 97% of Web
sites collected an e-mail address or some other type of personally
identifying information while only 20% even partially implemented the
20
four fair information practice principles. Moreover the Commission found
that only 8% of Web sites participated in the industry’s self-regulatory
enforcement initiative—online privacy seal programs—and concluded that
21
reliance on industry efforts was futile.
This is a classic case of self-regulatory failure. Businesses, given
ample time to get things right, have chosen to steal information
aggressively and secretly from citizens while maintaining a façade of effort
to self-regulate and to comply with governmental requests to take action.
While the government has patiently encouraged industry to act, harvesting
22
personal data has become a $1.5 billion market. This market is comprised
of “data warehousing” businesses like Acxiom and First Data that collect
and sell information such as ethnic and religious affiliations, property
purchases and loan data, travel destinations, and even pet ownership on 165
23
million Americans.
These covert undertakings are further disguised by companies such as
TRUSTe.com, which licenses online merchants with “trustmarks” and
24
provides users with a false sense of security. Although TRUSTe.com is
currently the most successful self-regulatory program, it does not assess the
16. Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the
Electronic Marketplace: A Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress, at i (May 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000text.pdf [hereinafter FTC
Privacy Report].
17. Id. (emphasis in original).
18. Id. (quoting Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey).
19. Id.
20. Id. at ii.
21. Id.
22. Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 776 (1999).
23. Id. These statistics may be verified at http://www.acxiom.com (last visited Nov. 30,
2001).
24. Froomkin, supra note 8, at 1525. See also Reidenberg, supra note 22, at 778
(discussing the similar failure of BBBOnline, the project of the Better Business Bureau).
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quality of the privacy policy, conduct an audit, or revoke certification if the
online licensee violates its own privacy policy. Licensees only need to pay
a licensing fee and have a privacy policy in existence to obtain a
25
trustmark. To illustrate the falseness of this supposed privacy protection
system, TRUSTe.com declined to revoke GeoCities’ trustmark even after
the FTC brought charges against GeoCities for collecting and disclosing
detailed consumer information to marketers—including e-mail addresses,
postal addresses, income, education, gender, marital status, and
occupation—despite GeoCities’ promise that customer registration
26
information would not be released without the customer’s permission.
Another trustmark holder, RealNetworks RealJukebox Software, created
and transmitted GUIDs through the Internet to catalog an individual’s
27
listening habits whenever the individual used the software. Even though
RealNetworks’ privacy policy concealed this practice, TRUSTe.com again
28
declined to revoke RealNetworks’ trustmark. Nor did TRUSTe.com
revoke Microsoft’s trustmark after discovering that Microsoft routinely
sent GUIDs during Windows 98 registrations when users expressly denied
29
Microsoft permission to do so.
The fraudulent nature of this system is not surprising, as
TRUSTe.com and other certification programs have no incentive to
30
strangle their sole revenue sources. Considering that the vast majority of
the public may be unaware of this misrepresentation and believes in the
illusion of safety created by the placement of a trustmark on a Web site,
this misplaced trust may lower users’ personal guards, leading them to
reveal more information than they would in situations without the
appearance of the privacy-ensuring mechanisms. These user perceptions
may ultimately result in a situation more detrimental to users than the
absence of privacy policies or trustmarks altogether.

2.

The Agency Approach

In May 2000, the FTC recommended legislative standards for online
data acquisition activities and the creation of an agency to implement these
31
standards and to promulgate further legislation. The proposed legislation
would explicitly require all consumer-oriented commercial Web sites to

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Froomkin, supra note 8, at 1525.
Id. at 1526.
Id. at 1525.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1527.
FTC Privacy Report, supra note 16, at 36.
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comply with the four widely accepted fair information practice principles:
32
notice, choice, access, and security.
At the outset, it is unclear why the FTC observed an industry secretly
profiting from users’ stolen personal information for five years before
making any legislative recommendation. Public choice theory would
explain this behavior by arguing that administrative officials are strategic
actors, using the regulatory processes to showcase their career talents and
to gain the favor of prospective industry employers by changing policies in
33
subtle ways. The consequence of such behavior is that agencies are
34
“captured” by the entities that they are supposed to be regulating. This
may elucidate why the FTC allowed online industries to profit for such an
extended period before proposing regulation. Public choice theorists argue
that bureaucrats, like other rational economic actors, seek to maximize their
influence on public policy, their discretionary budget, their power, and their
35
utility. By prolonging its involvement in the online privacy debacle, the
FTC might have been attempting to secure its position and power over
future Internet-related policies.
Another problem with the FTC’s approach is that it lacks a coherent
understanding of information technology. This problem has led to a
proposal that fails to protect individual privacy rights adequately. For
example, although the FTC recommended that Web sites be required to
provide users access to collected information, it could not define “access,”
admitting that the term could mean total access, partial access, or access
only when the Web site “uses the personal information to grant or deny
significant benefits to an individual, and where granting access would
36
improve the accuracy of the data in a way that justifies the costs.”
Depending on the definition, the proposed level of required “access” could
actually become “no access.” The Commission’s other proposed principles
provide equally scarce guidance regarding how online entities are to
37
comply with the fair information practice principles. This attempt to avoid
defining key terms that serve as foundations of proposed regulation and to
jump straight into structuring the regulation is perplexing.

32. Id.
33. Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspective on the Politics of Regulation, in II
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1277, 1278 (1989).
34. Id.
35. Ronald Wintrobe, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE 429, 431 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
36. FTC Privacy Report, supra note 16, at 31.
37. Id.
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Indeterminate definitions amplify risks of capture. In deciding the
appropriate parameters of proposed privacy regulations, bureaucrats may
yield to the well-explicated concerns of business lobbyists to the detriment
39
of unorganized and unheard individuals. But concrete statutory definitions
also pose risks. Static structures are ill-suited for the governance of an
extremely dynamic system, are complicated by the burden of designing
detailed regulations to address different data acquirers (i.e., online
merchants, employers), and at some point eventually render the legislation
40
inapplicable or inadequate to deal with the latest state of technology.
Neither industry self-regulation nor federal agency protection hold
much promise for improving cyberspace privacy. In light of this deficiency,
legislation that builds universal privacy rights into the foundation of the
system without mandating the need for a victim to undergo costly and
uncertain ex post facto litigation is the most viable route.

B.

Qualified Legislative Success

The United States’ track record is rife with piecemeal approaches to
patch up privacy leaks after they have sprung. Congress has attempted to
fix targeted areas with narrow privacy legislation: the Privacy Act of 1974,
to provide individuals more control over the data the government collects
41
about them; the Freedom of Information Act, to increase governmental
42
agency information disclosures; the Fair Credit Reporting Act, to protect
43
consumers against inaccurate credit information; and the Video Privacy
Protection Act, to prevent the disclosure of video tape rental or sale
44
records. Only the Electronic Communications Privacy Act addresses the
interception and disclosure of cyberspace data by nongovernmental actors,
but it is of little use for profiling activities because it exempts data that is

38. Terry Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE 455, 462 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). According to George Stigler, the capture
theory asserts that special business interests organize for political action more than
taxpayers and other large groups do. This is the case because the small number of
companies in each industry makes possible an increase in the concentration of benefits each
company receives from rules designed on its behalf. Id.
39. Noll, supra note 33, at 1277.
40. Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination
of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1424 (1987).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
42. See id. § 552. Parenthetically, as written, the Freedom of Information Act raises the
concern that it grants third parties increased access to information that would have been
private before the Act. Id. § 552 note (Supp. V 1999)
43. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-1681u (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).
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45

readily available to the public. Despite its acknowledgment of the need
for greater Internet privacy, Congress has not been receptive to proposed
legislation addressing online profiling, partly because of intense lobbying
46
by industry and partly because previous administrations were reluctant to
47
regulate Internet-specific concerns. Not surprisingly, today, the FTC’s
proposal languishes unpassed.

1.

Multinational Consensus

Contrary to the U.S. government’s position, what is needed is a
structure that recognizes a fundamental, but alienable, right to data privacy
and that strictly controls entities that profile Internet users on a worldwide
basis. The European Directive guarantees a broad floor of basic rights for
individual control of personal data collection, storage, use, disclosure, and
48
access to stored data for error correction. Under this omnibus legislation,
Member States are required to enact national laws that conform to the
Directive’s comprehensive standards and maintain an independent data
49
controller to oversee and enforce the standards. The Directive is a
“comprehensive endorsement of ‘First Principles,’” a set of fair
information practices that assure individuals’ participation in the
50
acquisition and use of their personal data.
The First Principles have gained wide acceptance, as the United
States, Europe, the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development (“OECD”), and New Zealand have committed
to these practices in the course of their establishment over the last thirty
51
years. The First Principles concern four main categories of standards: “(1)
data quality; (2) transparency or openness of processing; (3) treatment of
particularly sensitive data, often defined as data about health, race,
religious beliefs, and sexual life, among other attributes; and (4)
45. See id. § 2510 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See supra text accompanying notes 13-14
discussing that “public” includes information that people consider private.
46. Graham, supra note 40, at 1428 n.165.
47. Internet Privacy and Electronic Communications: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 25-26
(1998) (statement of David L. Aaron, Under Secretary, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce) (explaining that enforcement of Internet regulations would be
difficult, would demand extensive governmental resources, and would give users a false
sense of security).
48. Council Directive 95/46, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281/38) 31, available at http://www.
europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/search/search-oj.html.
49. Id. art. 6.
50. Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1326-29 (2000).
51. Id. at 1327-29.
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52

enforcement mechanisms.” More exactly, the analysis of Colin Bennett
and Rebecca Grant regarding national data privacy legislation reveals First
Principle policy convergence into ten main standards for commercial
entities:
[1] Must be accountable for all personal information in its possession;
[2] Should identify the purposes for which the information is processed
at or before the time of collection;
[3] Should only collect personal information with the knowledge and
consent of the individual (except under specified circumstances);
[4] Should limit the collection of personal information to that which is
necessary for pursuing the identified purposes;
[5] Should not use or disclose personal information for purposes other
than those identified, except with the consent of the individual (the
finality principle);
[6] Should retain information only as long as necessary;
[7] Should ensure that personal information is kept accurate, complete,
and up to date;
[8] Should protect personal information with appropriate security
safeguards;
[9] Should be open about its policies and practices and maintain no
secret information systems;
[10] Should allow data subjects access to their personal information,
53
with an ability to amend it if necessary.

Although developed for privacy protection generally, these guidelines
are applicable to regulating online activities, as demonstrated by the
European Directive.

2.

Lessons Learned

Admittedly, the European Directive is an accomplishment far ahead
of anything the United States has achieved for privacy rights. Nevertheless,
the Directive has its problems. Critics have criticized it for failing to
adequately enforce compliance with its requirement that all people
processing personal information notify the data controller of their
54
activities. Critics also charge that the Directive fails to harmonize the
differences in national interpretation and implementation of the laws
55
applying it. These challenges are mitigated, however, by a working group
composed of the Member States’ data-protection controllers that creates a
52. Id. at 1326.
53. Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant, Introduction, in VISIONS
OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 6 (Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant,
eds. 1999)) (emphasis in original).
54. Reidenberg, supra note 22, at 784.
55. Id.
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formal channel through which Member States can consult and reach
56
consensus on the interpretation of different Directive provisions. In
addition, to combat divergences in the execution of the standards, the
Directive includes a provision for consensus on industry codes of conduct
57
that can be used to certify privacy-assuring technologies.
Notable difficulties remain, however, as the European Directive
strains global business relations. The Directive creates tension for global
information networks by including provisions that ensure European
personal information will be handled according to European standards.
These provisions also provide the authority to restrict transborder data
flows to countries that do not have the appropriate level of privacy
58
protection. Moreover, these statutory attributes pressure non-Member
States to enact Europe’s subjective determination of appropriate privacy
protections in order to continue information-related business transactions
with them.
The five-year period over which the European Directive was
negotiated, and the additional three years that it took to implement the
59
Directive into law, amounted to a substantial delay severely misaligned
with the fast pace of the Internet. By the time the Directive was finally
60
implemented, much abuse had already been allowed to pass unchallenged.
These problems, and those known to be inherent in legislation
generally, present opportunities from which the United States could learn in
the construction of a superior privacy protection system. The U.S.
government must overcome its reluctance to regulate the Internet and act to
protect its citizens from commercial exploitation. Internet-facilitated
commercial exploitation of personally identifiable information has given
bricks-and-mortar marketers an inexpensive way to accumulate extensive
information on consumers and prospective consumers at a level of detail
not possible in the physical world. Clickstream data can be used to create
permanent and easily disseminated records of a user’s every online
keystroke. Users are powerless to control this practice. This scenario is
analogous to being incessantly stalked through a random walk in a mall,
down a street while window-shopping, or while purchasing a cup of coffee
with cash, with the stalker’s intricate observations sold and used to target
56. Id. at 785.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 786.
59. Id. at 787.
60. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 48, 31-50 (“Whereas increasingly frequent
recourse is being had in the Community to the processing of personal data in the various
spheres of economic and social activity; whereas the progress made in information
technology is making the processing and exchange of such data considerably easier . . . .”).
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the stalked victim. Perhaps falling behind Europe in this important area will
spark the United States’ competitive spirit and give it the impetus to fulfill
its duty to protect its citizens.

C.

Making Legislation Work

1.

Proposing New Legislation: The Federal Umbrella Statute

A potential solution to the current privacy disaster is a legislative
umbrella structure consisting of both the federal government and the state
governments. Under this scheme, the federal government would
promulgate a statutory mandate that all states appoint independent quasigovernmental agencies to enact laws in line with the objectives of the First
Principles to protect Internet users against online commercial profiling. For
the purposes of this discussion, this federal statute will be called the
“Online Commercial Privacy Act” (“OCPA”). State governments would
completely control the construction of their own independent agencies,
which would have wide latitude in statutory promulgation. The federal
government would then appoint its own independent quasi-governmental
agency to oversee the states’ progress. This structure would continue
indefinitely, until the federal agency determined that national alignment
was needed, or until the agency determined that the states’ progress was
insufficient. The OCPA would create the following rudimentary statute:
ONLINE COMMERCIAL PRIVACY ACT
(a) Establishment of a Federal Agency. There is established a federal
independent quasi-governmental agency to be known as the Agency on
Privacy in Commerce (in this title referred to as the “Agency”).
(b) State Agencies. Each state must establish an independent quasigovernmental agency to create default-rule privacy protections for Internet
users clearly consistent with the First Principles of the European Directive.
Each state will be responsible for protecting Internet users accessing the
Internet through Internet Service Providers located in its state. State
agencies must establish auditing and enforcement procedures that provide
remedies to individual victims, create consequences for violators, and
ensure the operational effectiveness of their legislative enactments. No
other provisions of this Act will apply to the state agencies.
(c) Membership in Federal Agency.
(1) In General. The Agency members shall serve for the life of the Agency.
The membership of the Agency shall be as follows:
(A) Two (2) representatives from the federal government, one appointed by
the Majority Leader of the Senate, and one appointed by the Minority
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Leader of the Senate.
(B) Two (2) representatives from state and local governments, one
appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and one
appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
(C) Two (2) representatives from the electronic commerce industry,
comprised of:
(i) One (1) representative from a large business in the electronic
commerce industry, who does not have the same political party affiliation
as that of the small business representative. This representative shall be
appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate.
(ii) One (1) representative from a small business in the electronic
commerce industry, who does not have the same political party affiliation
as that of the large business representative. This representative shall be
appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate.
(D) Two (2) representatives from consumer advocacy groups, one
appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and one
appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
(E) One (1) representative from education or academia, elected through a
Congressional vote.
(2) Vacancies. Any vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as the
original position.
(d) Acceptance of Gifts and Grants. Agency members may only accept
gifts or grants for the exclusive and complete purpose of promoting the
goals of the Agency. Gifts or grants shall become the property of the
Agency. The amounts of all gifts or grants, the name of the donor party,
any corporate or entity affiliation of the donor party, and a detailed
description of the gift or grant must be disclosed in the public record.
(e) Other Resources. The Agency shall have reasonable access to the
resources of the federal government.
(f) Agency Rules.
(1) Quorum. Eight members of the Agency shall constitute a quorum.
(2) Meetings. All meetings shall be closed to the public.
(3) Records. Complete and accurate records shall be kept at all meetings.
Records of aggregate committee decisions shall be open to the public.
Records open to the public will not disclose the individual votes of the
members.
(4) Actions. Decisions to act by the Agency must be unanimous.
(g) Duties of the Agency.
(1) In General. The purpose of the Agency is the evaluation and
recordation of state progress. To achieve these purposes, the Agency shall
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conduct thorough and extensive studies of all state treatment of online
privacy protections from Web organizations. The Agency shall review the
states’ progress, determine if progress has been sufficient, and administer
changes as needed based on existing state infrastructures. Although the
Agency will have the authority to align states’ privacy systems with the
goals of the First Principles, its primary objective is to monitor systems
created and administered by the states themselves.
(2) Issues To Be Studied. The Agency shall conduct thorough and extensive
studies annually to monitor states’ progress and the corresponding effects
on the individual user, the industry, and the economy. Such studies may
include tracking of user-contracting and default-rule usage, types of data
collection by commercial entities, revenue trends for online companies,
revenue trends for the data trade generally, Internet commerce trends,
Internet usage trends, Internet activity trends, and related activities.
(3) Authority For Action. The Agency shall have the authority to exchange
legislation adopted in one state with that of another state, or with that from
a combination of states, if the Agency determines that a state or states are
substantially misaligned with the First Principle goals of privacy
protection. The Agency will give deference to states’ actions when it is in
doubt as to whether the degree of misalignment justifies federal agency
intervention.
(4) Reporting. The Agency will compile a comprehensive official report on
an annual basis that details its findings and its current position. This report
will be made available to the public.

a.

State Responsibilities

Each state would create an independent body to develop default rule
protections for Internet users in accordance with the First Principles. States
would then govern online profiling issues locally unless the federal agency,
through its annual study and review process, concluded that state efforts
were not adequately ameliorative. In this case, the federal agency would
have the authority to harmonize state laws based on one or more of the
empirically tested privacy systems established by the states. In this way,
states would function as miniature think tanks, which would resume local
control after harmonization to continue adjusting their legislation to the
changing needs of the online world.
The default rules would set laws by which profiling entities would
have to abide, unless those entities contracted alternate agreements with
individual users. The structure of the default rule would be very important
because it would allocate the burden of attaining the visitor’s personal data.
Adherence to the First Principles mandates that commercial entities obtain
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knowledge and consent before collecting personal data; however, what
constitutes “knowledge” and “consent” is arguably ambiguous, and would
profoundly affect overall privacy protection. For instance, a default rule
structured for enhanced user protection might interpret “knowledge” as a
completely informed understanding for specified levels of profiling activity
(i.e., collection, use, sale) after the Web site has disclosed the purposes of
the activities and the third parties involved (i.e., sale to X.com for the
purpose of soliciting visitors).
The rule might interpret “consent” as stringently: explicit permission
granted by the user after being directly approached by the Web site on the
user’s first visit. In contrast, a default rule lenient to businesses might
interpret “knowledge” as the awareness that online profiling is widespread,
and “consent” as merely placing oneself in cyberspace. In essence,
definitional distinctions could create state conditions that span the spectrum
from opt-in to opt-out clauses. Clearly, these implementations would have
starkly opposite consequences, perhaps resulting in no statute at all in some
states as a practical matter. Even with protection disparities across states,
although impossible to quantify, this system would probably still result in
greater overall privacy protection. This is likely because a decentralized
structure would help to mitigate the risk of special interest groups
dominating the process while federal oversight keeps outliers in check.
This statute would require businesses to comply with the state
regulations in which their visitors’ ISPs resided. Logistically, commercial
entities would be able to code for automatic identification of a visitor’s
Internet Protocol address and the subsequent tracking of the ISP server
location, linking that entity’s profiling procedures to the resultant state’s
statutes. This linking of compliance to the location of visitors’ ISPs acts as
a disincentive for state agency officials to structure business-friendly state
legislation in an attempt to procure favors or attract lucrative business to
the state.
Admittedly, such a system would place a disproportionate cost burden
on smaller companies, who would have to allocate a larger percentage of
their operating budgets than would larger companies in order to comply
with the various state regulations. With the advent of a federal umbrella
statute, an enterprising computer engineer or software company would
logically create a software package to automate this task for businesses
across the nation, complete with software patches to upgrade the software
for changes in regulations as necessary. The availability of such
commercial software would presumably decrease the total cost for
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businesses to comply with the federal umbrella statute, though not
alleviate the disparate cost between large and small businesses as a
percentage of their operating budgets. Ultimately, the additional cost for
such software would not seem to be a problem that would outweigh the
benefits of the federal umbrella statute.
Moreover, the federal umbrella statute would most likely protect state
citizens against actions of offshore businesses and the tax system against
businesses relocating offshore to circumvent the profiling statutes. New
Internet jurisdictional issues are already beginning to be settled, for
example, in the area of Internet gambling. Internet gambling through
servers licensed and located offshore has been held illegal under the
Federal Interstate Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Interstate
Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act, if the person who is
62
gambling is physically present within the United States. Courts have held
that personal jurisdiction may be established even though the gambling
63
businesses are physically located offshore. Courts have also held that
operators of Internet gambling enterprises cannot move their computer
64
servers offshore to divest a state of its jurisdiction and escape liability.
More specifically, if an individual logs onto the gambling site from a given
state and places a bet, the gambling is deemed to have taken place there, in
65
violation of both federal and state law, and is prosecutable in that state.
61. According to David L. Randall, a computer software engineer located in Austin,
Texas, design of such software would not be prohibitively difficult, and would take
approximately one “man-year” to develop. If the cost for the creation of such software were
estimated at approximately a one-year salary for a software engineer capable to design such
a system, the design cost for the software could be estimated at $75,000. As most business
software is sold for over $100, and as there are well over 750 businesses that would have to
comply with the federal umbrella statute, the profit on such software would be substantial.
This potential for substantial profit by the developer of such software makes it extremely
likely that it would be made available on a commercial basis at a price that is less than the
cost of the total initial development and somewhat on par with other commercial software.
Interview with David L. Randall, Computer Software Engineer, Sculpted Systems. (Mar.
2001).
62. Joel Michael Schwarz, The Internet Gambling Fallacy Craps Out, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1021, 1069-70 (1999).
63. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d by
an equally divided court, 576 N.W.2d 747 (1998) (finding personal jurisdiction over a nonresident Internet gambling business based on Internet and physical-world contacts). See also
Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident Internet gambling business based on the defendant’s
advertising in Texas, permitting the Texas plaintiff to log in and gamble from Texas, and
sending prize money to the Texas plaintiff).
64. People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
See also L.E. Servs, Inc. v. State Lottery Comm’n, 646 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that gambling takes place in the state from which the transmission originated).
65. See generally World Interactive Gaming, 714 N.Y.S.2d 844; L.E. Servs, 646 N.E.2d
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Similar applications of jurisdiction to Internet privacy violations would
help protect state citizens and discourage businesses from relocating in an
attempt to evade privacy legislation.
The federal umbrella statute would also require state independent
agencies to enact auditing mechanisms to ensure business compliance with
state statutes and enforcement mechanisms that provide remedies to
individual victims and appropriate consequences to violators. Although
state independent bodies would have complete control of the creation of
their auditing and enforcement mechanisms, one approach for enforcement
could be to provide Web-based complaint forms at the state level that could
initiate an investigation into the practices of the named entity.

b.

Federal Supervision

The federal independent quasi-governmental agency would have
extensive powers and be small, consisting of delegates from different
groups to represent a diversity of viewpoints. The agency’s role would be
to annually review states’ progress and conduct studies to determine if
progress had been sufficient. It would have the authority to transplant
legislation adopted in one state with that of another state if the agency
determined that a state was substantially misaligned with the privacy
protection goals of the First Principles.
This decentralized umbrella structure is potentially, but not
necessarily, a final solution. After a few years of evaluation, the
independent federal agency could determine that some states have created
substantially more attractive infrastructures than other states, and decide to
implement one state’s or a combination of states’ infrastructures on a
national level. If this implementation were to occur, states would
automatically regain full control of their local laws after harmonization,
and would be allowed to modify their systems as long as such modification
66
would not result in a decreased level of “clearly consistent” compliance
with the goals of the First Principles. Review would repeat indefinitely on
an as-needed basis. The federal agency could also determine that the
majority of states have developed laudable protections that, while possibly
divergent, nonetheless adequately achieved the First Principle goals and did
not cause notable economically or socially adverse consequences. In such a
case, states would continue to operate their local infrastructures without the
federal harmonization process.

334.
66. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
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If negative externalities arose from substantial disparities, such as
business discrimination against citizens of the more heavily protected states
or a distortion of interstate competition, the federal agency would rectify
the situation by applying one state’s or a mixture of states’ frameworks on
a national level. Additionally, the federal agency would generally defer to
state judgment, be sympathetic to local control over federal control, and
favor greater privacy protections over more relaxed standards.

2.

System Implications

The federal umbrella structure would benefit all parties—users,
industry, and government.

a.

Users Would Be More Protected

A combined system provides for more user protection than local or
federal legislation alone would accomplish. Because the federal agency
would be sympathetic to individual privacy, the umbrella structure would
embed extra safeguards into the legislative system. In the event that an
individual resided in a probusiness state whose independent agency failed
to implement adequate default rules, the federal agency would bring that
state into line. Although not infallibly prophylactic, this decentralized
structure helps prevent successful industry lobbying efforts and agency
capture through an exponential increase in and spreading of industry
targets, leading to greater privacy protection on average.
The addition of independent state agencies to the regulatory regime
permits the establishment of default rules sensitive to local cultural issues,
and faster responses to cyberspace change. Local authority also enables
more thorough auditing and enforcement coverage than would occur from a
more removed federal level.
By adopting objectives based on the First Principles, the federal
government guarantees Internet users a baseline of privacy protection.
These objectives have been developed over thirty years, have gained
multinational consensus, and have been adopted into many laws across the
world. Users can accordingly have a higher degree of confidence in these
rules than may be the case with a framework quickly assembled solely by
our state and federal governments.
The default rule system is a fantastic advancement for user privacy
protection because it allows a context-specific assessment of the value of
personal data to that user. If a user places higher value on her personal data
than does the commercial entity, the user’s right to retain the
confidentiality of her data will be ensured. On the other hand, if the
commercial entity places a higher value on the user’s data than does the
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user, the commercial entity will be able to use that data and the individual
will be entitled to whatever enticements are traded for that permission. This
arrangement is beneficial for users, because setting a default rule for the
way a commercial entity must operate, unless otherwise agreed, corrects
the power disparity between the user and the information broker. The
arrangement is further beneficial because it mandates that users have all of
their personal data completely hidden unless they permit otherwise. The
arrangement insists that users be given an actual choice about whether or
not their information is gathered and used. Finally, the arrangement
structures the relationship such that the business must somehow
compensate the normal, nonexhibitionist user for the benefit of profiting
from that individual’s identity information.

b. Industry Would Benefit from Tested Fundamentals and Clear
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Under the umbrella structure, a number of different systems—perhaps
even fifty—would be tried and tested, decreasing the risk to industry that
an overly onerous standard would be promulgated on a national level.
Likewise, structuring default rules around the First Principles infuses the
system with an element of safety because these Principles have been
developed over time and adopted internationally. Further, this system
would force American businesses to comport with global standards, would
simplify international business transactions, and would bring new
opportunities.
The development of default rules provides industry with clear
expectations of required behavior and allows commercial entities to
contract around the rules in cases where the benefits of contracting
outweigh the transaction costs. Promulgation at the state level helps local
businesses by infusing the process with an understanding of local cultural
business issues. Although their perspectives would depend on their
compositions, state agencies would certainly frame legislation with more of
a local understanding than federal authorities that comprehensively
promulgate regulations for all fifty states. State agencies would also have
more flexibility than the national government, due to their smaller
territorial responsibility. The corresponding enhanced agility in initial
implementation and response to technological changes would help to
minimize business uncertainty over future developments and sunk costs for
business strategies involving newly-prohibited activities. At the same time,
retaining federal oversight provides a monitoring capacity to check
potentially draconian local enactments.
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Federal and State Governments Would Benefit

By structuring default rules around the First Principles, the federal
government achieves a privacy floor for users and increased opportunities
for American business. This both accommodates major constituents and
simultaneously fosters international appreciation for its steps toward the
global harmonization of privacy standards. Further, it avoids the resourceintensive process of developing its own objectives. In addition, the
government would presumably realize enhanced tax revenues from the
expanded American business opportunities abroad stemming from new
international trust in American business activities. Concededly, this may be
partially offset by a decrease in tax revenues due to limitations on profiting
from surreptitious profiling activities.
The federal government would gain valuable data regarding potential
regulatory schemes through empirically-tested privacy systems from its
state-composed think tank, using the states as test cases for the
development of an appropriate national framework in the event one became
necessary. Meanwhile, the federal government would be able to retain
ultimate control over the process and deploy fewer resources than would be
necessary to maintain such a system under national legislation.
State agency delegation would be faster overall than would be
possible in the federal legislature because of the reduced diversity of
interests and constituents to appease. This expediency would mitigate the
risk of legislation lagging even farther behind an increasingly entrenched
Internet architecture. A corollary benefit would be mitigating the risk that
online privacy concerns will stunt the proliferation of online commerce if
individual privacy interests are unbalanced with the benefits of the Internet.
Additionally, the feasibility of speedily implementing protections would
minimize the risk of resigning to a hastily-created federal structure that
may ultimately prove undesirable.
The umbrella structure also benefits state governments because it
gives them more control over the laws that affect their residents. It
increases the effective protections for their residents by allowing for faster
modification of profiling regulations to adapt to new technological and
cultural concerns. At the same time, the prospect that the federal agency
will pull outlier states into line with the national norm decreases an
individual state’s risk of losing local businesses due to its having a more
stringent regulatory system than other states.

IV. CONCLUSION
The digital world presents a wholly unique challenge to our
regulatory systems. In it, the potential for privacy invasion is universal and
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entrenched. Industry self-regulation has not seriously attempted to combat
this stampede, and existing legislation is not well-positioned to establish a
framework that safeguards Internet users from the commercial amassing of
individual dossiers from online information. For these reasons, a new and
unique legislative format tailored to address the distinctive harms created
by the electronic exploitation of personal information is the best avenue for
removing the integrity of personal information from the grip of industry’s
natural competitive and commercial tendencies.
The federal umbrella structure meets the main objectives of protecting
online users from surreptitious identity data collection, with ancillary but
distinct benefits to industry and government. With this system, industry
would operate within tested and widely-accepted parameters that have a
lower likelihood of unforeseen negative consequences than any newlyestablished regime. Additionally, this system would expand global
opportunities to American businesses by forcing their operations to comply
with internationally accepted principles, and would allow for clear costbenefit analysis for contractual arrangements outside of the default rules.
Federal and state governments would benefit from reduced cost, increased
expediency, enhanced international acceptance, and higher quality laws.
With the rapid speed of technological innovation, delay in the
establishment of an appropriate profiling privacy framework raises the
costs for all involved to the point where it becomes prohibitively costly to
implement. If lawmakers do not act now, American citizens will not be
able to safeguard our identities effectively. And then, citizens will have lost
not only their privacy, but also a government supposedly created for the
people.
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